Explanations and causal judgments are differentially sensitive to covariation and mechanism information

Citation:

Vasilyeva, N., & Lombrozo, T. (2015). Explanations and causal judgments are differentially sensitive to covariation and mechanism information. D. C. Noelle, R. Dale, A. S. Warlaumont, J. Yoshimi, T. Matlock, C. D. Jennings, & P. P. Maglio (Ed.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.
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Abstract:

We report four experiments demonstrating that judgments of explanatory goodness are sensitive both to covariation evidence and to mechanism information. Compared to judgments of causal strength, explanatory judgments tend to be more sensitive to mechanism and less sensitive to covariation. Judgments of understanding tracked covariation least closely. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of explanation, understanding and causal attribution.

Last updated on 02/05/2019