@article{204471,
  author = {Corey Cusimano and Natalia Zorrilla and David Danks and Tania Lombrozo},
  title = {Psychological Freedom, Rationality, and the Naive Theory of Reasoning},
  abstract = {<p>To make sense of the social world, people reason about others{\textquoteright} mental states, including whether and in what ways others can form new mental states. We propose that people{\textquoteright}s judgments concerning the dynamics of mental state change invoke a {\textquotedblleft}naive theory of reasoning.{\textquotedblright} On this theory, people conceptualize reasoning as a rational, semi-autonomous process that individuals can leverage, but not override, to form new rational mental states. Across six experiments, we show that this account of people{\textquoteright}s naive theory of reasoning predicts judgments about others{\textquoteright} ability to form rational and irrational beliefs, desires, and intentions, as well as others{\textquoteright} ability to act rationally and irrationally. This account predicts when, and explains why, people judge others as psychologically constrained by coercion and other forms of situational pressure.</p>
},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {153},
  pages = {837{\textendash}863},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001540},
}