@article{175516,
  author = {Sarah Aronowitz and Tania Lombrozo},
  title = {Learning through simulation.},
  abstract = {<p>Mental simulation {\textemdash} such as imagining tilting a glass to figure out the angle at which water would spill {\textemdash} can be a way of coming to know the answer to an internally or externally posed query. Is this form of learning a species of inference or a form of observation? We argue that it is neither: learning through simulation is a genuinely distinct form of learning. On our account, simulation can provide knowledge of the answer to a query even when the basis for that answer is opaque to the learner. Moreover, through repeated simulation, the learner can reduce this opacity, supporting self-training and the acquisition of more accurate models of the world. Simulation is thus an essential part of the story of how creatures like us become effective learners and knowers.</p>
},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Philosophers{\textquoteright} Imprint},
  volume = {20},
  pages = {1-18},
  url = {https://philpapers.org/rec/AROLTS},
  language = {eng},
}