@article{lombrozo2011campaign,
  author = {Tania Lombrozo},
  title = {The campaign for concepts},
  abstract = {<p>In his book Doing Without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that cognitive scientists should reject the concept of {\textquotedblleft}concept{\textquotedblright} as a natural, psychological kind. I review and critique several of Machery{\textquoteright}s arguments, focusing on his definition of {\textquotedblleft}concept{\textquotedblright} and on claims against the possibility and utility of a unified account of concepts. In particular, I suggest ways in which prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory approaches to concepts might be integrated.</p>
},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {50},
  pages = {165{\textendash}177},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217311000175},
  language = {eng},
}