@article{123511,
  keywords = {Humans, Thinking, Adult, Choice Behavior},
  author = {M Pacer and Tania Lombrozo},
  title = {Ockham{\textquoteright}s razor cuts to the root: Simplicity in causal explanation},
  abstract = {<p>When evaluating causal explanations, simpler explanations are widely regarded as better explanations. However, little is known about how people assess simplicity in causal explanations or what the consequences of such a preference are. We contrast 2 candidate metrics for simplicity in causal explanations: node simplicity (the number of causes invoked in an explanation) and root simplicity (the number of unexplained causes invoked in an explanation). Across 4 experiments, we find that explanatory preferences track root simplicity, not node simplicity; that a preference for root simplicity is tempered (but not eliminated) by probabilistic evidence favoring a more complex explanation; that committing to a less likely but simpler explanation distorts memory for past observations; and that a preference for root simplicity is greater when the root cause is strongly linked to its effects. We suggest that a preference for root-simpler explanations follows from the role of explanations in highlighting and efficiently representing and communicating information that supports future predictions and interventions. (PsycINFO Database Record</p>
},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {146},
  pages = {1761-1780},
  issn = {1939-2222},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000318},
  language = {eng},
}